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Born in 1903, Mike Mansfield had, 
by the age of 19, become a veteran 
of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army and 
the U.S. Marine Corps. By age 20 he 
was a miner in Butte; by 27, a mining 
engineer; by 30, a Professor of His-
tory at Montana State University, 
where he holds permanent tenure. 
Elected initially to the Congress in 
1942, he served five terms in the 
House of Representatives. Elected to 
the Senate in 1952 he is presently 
serving his third term in that body, 
whose Majority Leader he has been 
since 1961. 
Senator Mansfield's interest in for-
eign policy is virtually lifelong. In 
1951 he was appointed by President 
Truman as a Delegate to the UN 
Sixth Session in Paris. He was Presi-
dential Delegate to the Southeast Asia 
Conference in Manila in 1954. Presi-
dent Eisenhower appointed him U.S. 
Delegate to the UN 13th General 
Assembly. In 1962 he undertook an 
extensive foreign policy assignment 
for President Kennedy in West Ber-
lin, Southeast Asia and Vietnam, and 
a similar assignment for President 
Johnson in 1965 .. A member of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions and of the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee, Senator Mansfield is 
also Chairman of the Democratic Con-
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In the lecture here reprinted, Senator 
Mansfield has deepened our obliga-
tion to him, already profound, for 
the clarity, temperance and soundness 
with which he has analyzed our coun-
try's mo t formidable foreign policy 
problem. The U A W's Twentieth Con-
stitutional Convention declared, with 
respect to Sino-American relations, 
that "The ultimate goal is not victory 
O\'er a human enemy but rather vic-
tory over the scourges of poverty, 
hunger, ignorance and disease which 
affiict the people of Southeast Asia." 
After commending the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee for the invalu-
V1ctor G. R euther) Director) 
UA TV lntenwtional Affairs Department 
able service it had rendered in focus-
ing public attention on a country so 
little known but so vi tal to the future 
of world peace as China, that Con-
vention added that "however enigma-
tic and belligerent Red China may 
be, the U. S. must reappraise its posi-
tion toward that vast country." Mike 
Man field, in the analysis which you 
a re about to read, has explained why 
more cogently, more persuasively, than 
any public figure in this country who 
has yet spoken out on the China que -
tion. The UAW is grateful to the 
Uni\'ersil) of Montana Foundation 
both for its sponsorship of the lecture 
originall) and for permission to re-
print it. 
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Viet 1'\am i~ heavy on the heart of 
the nation. The Vietnamese war is a 
tragedy. It is a tragedy in the Ameri-
can li\es which it claims. It is a 
tragedy in the death and de,·astation 
which, in the name of sah-ation, it 
has spread throughout Viet :\'am. 
My views on United States policy 
respecting Viet !'\am are no secret. I 
ha\'e stated them, re~tated them, and 
elaborated them many times. I ha\'e 
cautioned again t an e'er-deepening 
military i m oh ement in that conflict. 
I am opposed to any increase in it 
today. I belie\e that the way out of a 
barbarous situation i~ not to go fur-
ther into it. 
s•ep One 
The first ~tep towards peace, in my 
judgment, is to concentrate and con-
solidate the U. S. military effort and 
to escalate the peace-effort, looking 
towards the negotiation of an hon-
orable end of the conflict. 
That, in brief, is the way I feel 
about Viet :\'am. That is the way I 
ha\e felt about it for a long time. The 
President knows it. The Senate knows 
it. ~fontana knows it. 
\\"hat I ha'e to sa) to )OU, today, 
touche~ only indirectly on \'iet :\am. 
\Iy remarko, a1e intended to go be-
)Ond Viet :\'am to what ma\ well be 
the root~ of the war. In this first 
lecture of the series on international 
affairs, I wi')h to address \OUr atten-
tion to what is the great 'oid in the 
foreign relations of thi'> nation-to 
the question of China. 
,\., a nation, we h<ne lived thJOugh 
a generation in onl) heana) associa-
tion with a third of the enti1 e human 
race .. -\t the inception of this \Oid, we 
were engaged in a costl) indecisi'e 
conflict in Korea-on China's nonh-
ea'>t fr ontie1. Two decades later, we 
are engaged once again in a costly 
and indecisi' e conflict, this time on 
China\ southeast fromier. These two 
two great militar) imohements on 
the Chine'>e periphery a1e not unre-
lated to the ab.,ence of rele' am con-
tact between China and the United 
~ta tes. 
Sooner or later a tenuouo, truce rna) 
be achie,ed in \'iet :\'am e'en as a 
truce was achic,cd in Korea. In my 
judgment , howe,cr, there will be no 
du1able peace in Korea, Viet :\'am, 
or amwhere che in .\sia unless thc1e 
is a candid confrontation with the 
problems of the Sino-U. S. relation-
.,hip. 
•C: 
China need'> peace if the potentials 
of ir.. culture a1e to be rcalited. This 
nation need.., peace for the '>ame Jea-
'>011. In thi., cia\ and age, the world 
need., peace for c i' ilited '>UI i' a!. You 
~oung people h;ne the greatest '>take 
rn peace. For that 1cason, I a<,k \OU 
to look be,ond \ ' ict '\am. behind 
1 
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2 Korea, to what may well be the core 
of the failure of peace in Asia-to the 
U. S.-Chinese estrangement of two 
decades. 
In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer 
of the Declaration of Independence, 
sent the first American clipper ship 
to trade with China. The year that 
President George Washington took 
the oath of office, 1789, fourteen 
American ships were riding at anchor 
in the Pearl River off Canton in South 
China. 
There are no American ships in 
Chinese ports today. There have not 
been for almost twenty years. In 
twenty years, hardly an American 
doctor, scientist, businessman, jour-
nalist, student, or even a tourist has 
set foot in China. 
How We See Each Other 
Across the Pacific Ocean, we and 
the Chinese glare at one another, un-
comprehendingly, apprehensively, and 
suspiciously. In the United States, 
there is fear of the sudden march of 
Chinese armies into Southeast Asia. 
In China, there is fear of a tighter 
American encirclement and American 
nuclear attack. 
We see millions of Chinese soldiers 
poised on China's frontiers. We see 
leaders who threaten in a most violent 
way. We see an internal Chinese tur-
moil to confirm our fears of irration-
ality and recklessness. Finally, we see 
a growing nuclear power, with the 
looming spectre of a full-fledged 
Chinese intercontinental ballistic 
missile force. 
On the other hand, the Chinese 
see themselves surrounded by massive 
American military power. They see 
U. S. naval, ground, and air bases 
scattered through Japan, Korea, Tai-
wan, Okinawa, Guam, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand. They see over 
half a million American troops in 
neighboring Viet Nam and hundreds 
of thousands more nearby. They see 
tremendous nuclear capability with 
missiles zeroed in on Chinese cities. 
They see the United States as 
"occupying" the Chinese island of 
Taiwan and supporting a Chinese 
government whose declared aim is the 
recapture of the mainland. And they 
see, too, what they describe as a grow-
ing collusion between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, a cuuntry 
which they believe infringes China's 
borders, threatens to corrupt the Chi-
nese revolution and exercises an un-
welcome influence throughout Asia. 
We and the Chinese have not al-
ways looked at one another with such 
baleful mistrust. The American images 
of China have fluctuated and shifted 
in an almost cyclical way. There has 
been the image of the China of wis-
dom, intelligence, industry, piety, stoi-
cism, and strength. This is the China 
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4 of Marco Polo, Pearl Buck, Charlie 
Chan, and heroic resistance to the 
Japanese during \Vorld \Var II. 
On the other hand, there has been 
the image of the China of cruelty, 
barbarism, violence, and faceless 
hordes. This is the China of drum-
head trials, summary executions, Fu 
Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion-
the China that is summed up in the 
phrase "yellow peril." 
A:·e n · :; • 
Throughout our history, these two 
images ha\e alternated, with first one 
predominant and then the other. In 
the eighteenth century, we looked up 
to China as an ancient civilitation-
superior in many aspects of technol-
ogy, culture, and social order and 
surrounded by an air of splendid 
mystery. Respect turned to contempt, 
however, with China's quick defeat by 
the British in the Opium War of 
1840. There followed acts of humilia-
tion of China such as participation in 
extra-territorial treaty rights and the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. 
Attitudes shifted again in the 
early twentieth century to one of be-
nevolence largely in consequence of 
the influence of missionaries. There 
were more missionaries in China from 
"the United States than from any 
other country. .More American mis-
sionaries served in China than any-
where else in the world. The Chinese 
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became, for this nation, a guided, 
guarded, and adored people. 
Chinese resistance to the Japanese 
invasion in 1937 produced another 
shift from benevolence to admiration. 
At the end of the Second \\'orld \Var, 
admiration was displaced by disap-
pointment and frustration, as the war-
time truce between Nationalist and 
Communist forces collapsed in cata-
clysmic internal strife. This nation 
became profoundly disenchanted with 
China, a disenchantmem whid1 was 
replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility. 
The hostilit) was largel) a reaction, 
of course, to the coming to powe1 of 
a Communist regime on the Chinese 
mainland. \\'e did not interpret this 
event as a consequence of the massi'e 
difficulties and the , ·ast inne1 weak-
nesses of a \\'aJ-torn China. Rather, we 
.,aw it almost as an aflront to this na-
tion. \Ve saw it as a treacherous exten-
sion of the So\ iet steam-roller policies 
which had 1 educed Ea., tel n and Cen-
ual Emope to subsenience at the 
end of World \\'a1 II. 
Then, in 1918, came a Communist 
coup in CtedlOsloYak.ia and the So\ iet 
attempt to blockade Bellin. Ihe ll i-
umph of a Communist gcnernment in 
China followed immediately afte1 
the~e C\Cnts in Europe. The nation 
was '>hak.en to its finge1 tips. 
Still, the press of e\Cnts continued 
relentle.!>sl). In June 1950, the ~cnth 
Koreans launched a sudden attack on 
South Korea. The Chinese forces in-
tenened in the war in :'\0\embeJ of 
that )Car. The United States was 
brought into a major milita1) con-
frontation in which, fo1 the fnst time, 
the Chinese were enemies and not 
allies. 
.\fter these events, the assumptions of 
.\merican policy towards China were 
revised. An eiT01t was made to meet 
both the concern and outrage respect-
ing China which existed in this na-
tion and the revolutiona1} militancy 
of the new Chinese 1egime in Asia. 
Policy was cast anew on the premise 
that the government on the Chinese 
mainland was an aggressor which, sub-
ject to directions from ;\lose ow, would 
usc force to impose international Com-
munism on .\ sia. ComeJsCl), it was 
assumed that if the endorsement of 
the f1 ee nation-. '''CI e withheld, this 
re{{ime which was -.aid to be "alien" 
to the Chinese people '>Ome sort of 
0\ er-grown puppet of :\foscow-would 
wither and e\el1lually collapse. 
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6 On this basis, recognition was not 
extended to Peking. The official view 
was that the National Government, 
which had 1etreated to the island of 
Taiwan, continued to speak for all of 
China. \Ve cut all trade with the 
mainland and did what could be done 
to encourage other countries to follow 
suit. In a similar fashion, we led a 
diplomatic campaign year after year 
against the seating of the Chinese 
People's Republic in the United Na-
tions. \Ve drew an ar<. of military 
alliances on the ~eaward side of China 
and undergirded them with the de-
ployment of massive American mili-
tary power in bases throughout the 
\Vestern Pacific. 
Much has happened to call into 
question the assumptions in which 
these policies towards China have 
been rooted. In the first place, the 
People's Republic has shown itself to 
be neither a part of a Communist 
monolith nor a carbon copy of Soviet 
Russia. The fact is that, of the num-
erous divi~ions which have arisen 
within the Communist world, the 
differences between Moscow and Pek-
ing h;l\e been the most significant. 
They 'iO 1 emain today although the 
more rasping edges of the conflict ap-
pear somewhat tempered by the war 
in VietNam. 
At the same time, the government 
on the mainland has not only sur-
'ived, it has provided China with a 
functioning leadership. Under its di-
rection, Chinese society has achieved 
a degree of economic and scientific 
progress, apparently sufficient for sur-
vival of an enormous and growing 
population and sophisticated enough 
to produce thermo-nuclear explo-
-.ions. 
Revolution Within Revolution 
In the last two years, the so-called 
Cultural R evolution in China has re-
kindled what has been a periodic ex-
pectation that the Peking government 
is on the verge of collapse and the 
way i-. open for a military return to 
the mainland of the National Govern-
ment on Taiwan. There seems to be 
little doubt that the turmoil in China 
has camed serious di'>ruptions. vVhat 
appears in conflict in the cultural 
revolution, however, is not the Peking 
<,tructure as such but the adequacy of 
its ideological content. That would 
be a far cry from the kind of popular 
revolution which might be expected 
to open the doors to a new regime. 
In any event, the worst of the up-
heavals within China appear to have 
ended months ago, without any irre-
parable break in the continuity of 
the government or the operations of 
the economy. It is the height of folly 
to envision, in the present situation, 
an occasion for the overthrow of the 
Peking government by external mili-
tary pressures. Indeed, what would be 
better calculated to end, o,·ernight, 
the remaining ferment on the main-
land than a plausible threat to the 
security of China or an actual attack 
on Chinese territory? 
China: Aggressive? 
If the People's Republic, then, is 
here to stay, what of the other assump-
tion on which this nation's policy 
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respecting China has long been based? 
What of the assumption that the 
Chinese government is an expanding 
and aggressive force? That it is re-
strained from sweeping through Asia 
because we have elected to meet its 
challenge along the 17th Parallel 
which divides the Northern and 
Southern parts of Viet Nam? 
In recent years, the present Chinese 
government has not shown any great 
eagerness to use force to spread its 
ideology elsewhere in Asia although 
Chinese armies have been employed 
in assertion of the traditional borders 
of China. To be sure, China has given 
enthusiastic encouragement and has 
promised to support wars of national 
liberation. However, China has not 
participated directly in these wars 
and support, when it has been forth-
coming, has been limited and circum-
spect. 
In Viet Nam, for example, there is 
certainly Chinese encouragement and 
aid for the North Vietnamese and the 
VietCong. Chinese involvement, how-
ever, has been far more peripheral 
than our own. The enemy soldiers 
with whom we are compelled to 
grapple are all Vietnamese and, in 
fact, most South Vietnamese. At every 
stage of the war, the assistance we 
have provided to South VietNam has 
far exceeded the aid from China and 
from all outside sources to the Viet 
Cong and North Viet Nam- both in 
terms of men and materiel. There is 
Chinese equipment in South VietNam 
but there are no Chinese battalions. 
Even in North Viet Nam, Chinese 
manpower is reported to amount, at 
most, to one-tenth of our forces in 
Viet Nam, and the great bulk of these 
Chinese are labor troops, some in-
volved in air-defense but most of 
them engaged in repamng bomb 
damage to roads, railroads, bridges, 
and the like. 
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along 
the Himalayan frontier of India, are 
often cited as evidence of militant 
Chinese Communist aggression. The 
fact is, however, that Tibet has been 
regarded, for many decades, as falling 
within China's over-all boundaries. 
Not only the Peking government but 
also the Chinese National Govern-
ment on Taiwan insists that Tibet 
belongs to China. India also acknowl-
edges such to be the case. Indeed, 
American policy has never recognized 
Tibet as other than Chinese territory. 
In the case of the border war with 
India in 1962, the Chinese Commu-
nists occupied territories which, again, 
not only they, but also the Chinese 
Nationalists, consider to be Chinese. 
It is precisely characteristic of a mili-
tant expansionism, moreover, for a 
government to withdraw its military 
forces from a territory which they 
have invested. Yet, the Peking govern-
ment did so from parts of India which 
were occupied in 1962 as well as from 
North Korea. 
No Economic Subversion Either 
As for indirect aggression through 
economic means, China has been able 
to exert only a liimted influence, 
either through aid or trade. In Africa 
and, indeed, in Southeast Asia, where 
attempts have been made to use trade 
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and aid for political ends, the results 
have been conspicuously successful. 
The fact is that most of China's trade 
today rests on a commercial-economic 
base. It is carried on largely with the 
non-Communist countries, including, 
may I add, many of our closest allies. 
In short, to speak of China, today, 
as aggressively expansionist is to re-
spond to Chinese words rather than 
Chinese actions. That is not to say 
that China will not pose all manner 
of threats tomorrow. If there are not 
enough nightmares already, consider 
the prospects when China's nuclear 
capabilities will have been extensively 
developed, along with a full-fledged 
intercontinental missile force. 
Of course, there is an immense po-
tential danger in China; but; there is 
also an immense potential danger in 
every other powerful nation in a 
world which has not yet learned how 
to maintain civilized survival in a 
nuclear age except on the ra70r's edge. 
Insofar as China is concerned, the 
fundamental question for us is not 
whether it is a danger, real or poten-
tial. The fundamental question is 
whether our present policies act to 
alleviate or to exacerbate the danger. 
Do we forestall the danger by jousting 
with the shadows and suspicions of the 
past? Do we help by a continuance 
in policies which do little if anything 
to lift the heavy curtain of mutual 
ignorance and hostility? 
Reconcilia on The :eps 
Like it or not, the present Chinese 
government is here to stay. Like it or 
not, China is a major power in Asia 
and is on the way to becoming a 
nuclear power. Is it, therefore, in this 
nation's interest and in th e interest of 
world peace to put aside, once and for 
all, what have been the persistent but 
futile attempts to isolate China? Is it, 
therefore, in this nation's interest and 
m the interest of world peace to try 
conscientiously and consistently to do 
whatever we can do--and, admittedly, 
it is not much-to reshape the rela-
tionship with the Chinese along more 
constructive and stable lines? In short, 
is it propitious for this nation to try 
to do what, in fact, the policies of 
most of the other Western democra-
cies have already long since done re-
garding their Chinese relationships? 
I must say that the deepening of 
the conflict in Viet Nam makes more 
difficult adjustments in policies re-
specting China. Indeed, the present 
course of events in Viet Nam almost 
insures that there shall be no changes. 
It is not easy to contemplate an allevi-
ation with any nation which cheers on 
those who are engaged in inflicting 
casualties on Americans. Yet, it may 
well be that this allevi~tion is an 
essential aspect of ending the war and, 
hence, American casualties. That con-
sideration, alone, it seems to me, 
9 
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10 makes desirable initiatives towards 
China at this time. 
There are several obvious areas in 
which these initiatives would have 
relevance. Discriminatory restriction 
on travel to China, for example, is 
certainly one of these areas. The 
Chinese may or may not admit Ameri-
cans to their country, as they choose. 
But it is difficult to understand why 
our own government should in any 
way, shape, or form seek to stand in 
the way of the attempts of American 
citizens to breech the great wall of 
estrangement between the two na-
tions. It is, indeed, ironic that during 
the past three years there have been 
more visits of Americans to North 
Viet Nam, a nation with which we are 
at war, than to China in the past 
thirteen years. 
Travel 
On the question of travel, it should 
be recalled that the Chinese were the 
first to suggest in 1956 that American 
journalists visit China. The suggestion 
was summarily rejected by the then 
Secretary of State. W'hen, later, it was 
decided to accept the suggestion, the 
Chinese had changed their minds. 
Since that time, this nation has been 
more inclined to ease the travel bar-
riers, on the basis of official agreement 
for exchanges of persons, but the 
Chinese have shown no disposition to 
enter into agreements or, for that 
L•- . . ' .. _. ""' --· 
matter, to admit Americans on any 
basis. 
In any event, it seems to me that it 
is in the positive interest of this na-
tion to encourage Americans, if they 
can gain entry, to travel to China. 
May I add, I refer not merely to the 
travel of selected journalists, doctors, 
and other specialists, as is now the 
policy, but to the travel of any re-
sponsible American. In the same 
fashion, it seems to me most appro-
priate to admit Chinese travelers to 
the United States under the same con-
ditions that pertain to visitors from 
other Communist countries. 
Trade 
Trade is another area in which long-
standing policies respecting China are 
open to serious question. Technically, 
this country still maintains an em-
bargo on all trade with China. The 
basis for this policy is compliance 
with a voluntary resolution of the 
United Nations which was adopted at 
our behest at the time of the Korean 
conflict. It is doubtful that the resolu-
tion ever carried much weight among 
the trading nations of the world. In 
any case, it has long since been for-
gotten. Today, the principal nations 
in the China trade in rough order of 
importance are the United Kingdom, 
Japan, the Soviet Union, West Ger-
many, Australia, Canada, Italy, and 
France. Of all the great maritime na-
tions, the United States alone clings 
to a total trade embargo with China. 
Moreover, we are also the only nation 
in the world which makes an effort to 
enforce what can best be described as 
a kind of secondary boycott of re-
exported Chinese products. 
These policies have had little visi-
ble economic impact, but they have 
had the most serious political reper-
cussions. It is conceivable that, to the 
.... -
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Chinese, the policies are something 
of an irritant. To friendly nations, 
however, they have been a source of 
constant friction. Most serious, their 
continuance over the years has in-
jected unnecessary venom into the at-
mosphere of U. S.-Chinese relations. 
Nor can it be said that the situation 
in Viet Nam has compelled the pur-
suit of the embargo and boycott. The 
fact is that these restrictions were in 
place before most Americans ever 
heard of Viet Nam, and, certainly, 
long before Americans became in-
volved in the war. If the Vietnamese 
conflict i now seen as justification for 
leaving these policies undi turbed, 
what is to be said of the existing atti-
tude toward trade with other Com-
munist countries? 
The fact is that the European Com-
munists are providing North Viet 
Nam and the Viet Cong with sophis-
ticated military equipment which, 
11 
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12 from all reports, exceeds in value the 
assistance which comes from China. 
On what basis, then, is it meaningful 
to permit and even to encourage non-
strategic trade with the European 
Communist countries while holding 
to a closed-door policy on trade with 
China? What constructive purpose is 
served by the distinction? Any ration-
alization of relations with China, it 
seems to me, will require an ad just-
ment of this dual approach. We need 
to move in the direction of equal 
treatment of all Communist nations 
in trade matters, whatever that treat-
ment may be. 
In any event, problems of travel 
and trade are secondary obstacles in 
the development of a more stable re-
lationship between China and the 
United States. There are other far 
more significant difficulties. I refer, 
principally, to the question of Taiwan 
and to the war in Viet N am. 
Vietnam: Roadblock to Peace 
There is no doubt that the Chinese 
government seeks in Viet Nam a gov-
ernment which is friendly, if not sub-
servient. Peking has not concealed, 
moreover, its desire for the with-
drawal of American military power 
from Southeast Asia. It does not fol-
low, however, that the price of peace 
in Southeast Asia is either Chinese 
domination or U. S. military interven-
tion. That is a black and white over-
simplification of a gray situation. The 
fact is that neither Burma on China's 
border nor Cambodia have been "en-
slaved" by China, despite an associa-
tion of many years, despite periodic 
difficulties with the great state to the 
north and despite an absence of U. S. 
support, aid, or protection. These two 
nations have managed to survive in a 
state of detachment from the power 
rivalries of the region. Furthermore, 
China is a signatory to the settlements 
which emerged from the Geneva Con-
ferences of I 954 and 1962 and which 
contain at least a hope for a middle 
way to peace in Indo-China. So far as 
I am aware, the Chinese have not 
been found in direct or unilateral 
violation of these agreements. It is not 
impossible that a similar settlement, 
with Chinese participation, might be 
reached on VietNam. 
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped 
that there can be a solution along 
these lines. Unless it is found, there is 
a very real danger-as the Korean ex-
perience shows-that the prolongation 
of war on China's frontiers may well 
bring about another U. S.-Chinese 
armed confrontation. 
Th T o China Pr blem 
Perhaps the most important element 
in the rebuilding of stable relations 
with China is to be found in a solu-
tion of the problem of Taiwan. It 
may help to come to grips with this 
issue, if it is understood at the outset 
that the island of Taiwan is Chinese. 
That is the position of the National 
Government of the Republic of 
China. That is the position of the 
People's Republic of China. For a 
quarter of a century, this common 
Chinese position has been reinforced 
by the policies and actions of the 
United States government. 
Since that is the case, I do not be-
lieve that a solution to the Taiwan 
question is facilitated by its statement 
in terms of a two-China policy, as has 
been suggested in some quarters in 
recent years. The fact is that there is 
one China which happens to ha'.e 
been divided into two parts by events 
which occurred a long time ago. Key 
factors in the maintenance of peace 
between the separate segments have 
been the interposition of U. S. mili-
tary power in the Taiwan straits, and 
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the strengthening of the National 
Government of China by massive in-
jections of economic and military aid. 
This course was followed by the 
United States for many reasons, not 
the least of which was that it made 
possible a refuge for dedicated allies 
and associates in the war against 
Japan. 1\Iost of all, however, it was 
followed because to have permitted 
the closing of the breech by a military 
clash of the two opposing Chinese 
forces would have meant a massive 
bloodbath and, in the end, the re-
kindling of another great war in Asia. 
Ca . " "·. 
8 !3 · ~qe~" 
However, the situation has changed in 
the \Vestern Pacific. Taiwan is no 
longer abjectly dependent for its sur-
vival on the United States. Some of 
the passions of the deep Chinese poli-
tical division have cooled with the 
passing of time .. \nother generation 
has appeared and new Chinese so-
cieties, in effect, have grown up on 
both sides of the Taiwan ~traits. 
Is there not, then, ~ome better way 
to confront this problem than threat-
and-counter-threat between island 
Chinese and mainland Chinese? Is 
there not some better way to li' e with 
this situation than by the armed truce 
which depends, in the last analysis, 
on the continued presence of the U. S. 
7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits? 
The questions cannot be answered 
until all involved a1e prepared to take 
a fresh look at the situation. It seems 
to me that it might be helpful if there 
could be, among the Chinese them-
selves, an examination of the possibili-
ties of improving the climate. As I 
have already indicated, the proper 
framework for any such consideration 
would be an acceptance of the conten-
tion of both Chinese groups- that 
there is only one China and Taiwan 
is a part of it. In that context, the 
questions at issue have to do with the 
dichotomous situation as between 
mainland and island governments and 
the possibility of bringing about con-
structive changes therein by peaceful 
means. 
There is no cause to be sanguine 
about the prospects of an approach 
of this kind. One can only hope that 
time may have helped to ripen the 
circumstances for settlement. It is 
apparent, for example, that the con-
cept \•:hich held the Chinese govern-
ment on Taiwan to be the sole hope 
of China's redemption has gmwn less 
re]e, ant with the years. For Taiwan, 
therefore, to remain i-.olated from the 
mainland is to court the risk that the 
island will be left once again, as it has 
been on other occasions, in the back-
wash of Chinese history. 
The remo' al of the wedge of separa-
tion, morem cr. would also seem to 
accord with the intere-.h of the main-
land Chinese gO\ emmcnt. It doe.'> 
have a legitimate concem in the rc-
as.,enion of the historic connection of 
Taiwan and China. It docs h<n c a 
concern in ending the ho-.tile di,ision 
which has been wql) and disruptive 
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14 both within China and in China's The Summation 
in tern a tiona) rei a tionshi ps. 
From the point of view of the 
United States, too, there is an interest 
in seeking a less tenuous situation. 
Progress in settl ing the Taiwan ques-
tion could contribute to a general 
relaxation of tensions in the Western 
Pacific and, conceivably, even to reso-
lution of the conflict in Viet Nam. 
Certainly, it would make possible a 
reduction in the enormous and costly 
over-all defense burdens which were 
assumed in Asian waters after World 
War II and which, two decades later, 
still rest on the shoulders of this 
nation. 
To sum up, then, it seems to me that 
the basic adjustment which is needed 
in policies respecting China is to make 
crystal clear that this government does 
not anticipate, much less does it seek, 
the overthrow of the government of 
the Chinese mainland. In addition, 
there is a need to end the discrimina-
tion which consigns China to an in-
ferior status as among the Communist 
countries in this nation's policies re-
specting travel and trade. Finally, it 
ought to be made unequivocal that 
we are prepared at all times to meet 
with Chinese representatives-form-
ally or informally-in order to con-
sider differences between China and 
the United States over Viet Nam or 
any other question of common con-
cern. 
Adjustments of this kind in the 
policies of the nation, it seems to me, 
require above all else a fresh perspec-
tive. We need to see the situation in 
Asia as it is today, not as it appeared 
twenty years ago in the Himalayan 
upheaval of the Chinese revolution. 
We need to see the situation not 
through the fog of an old and stag-
nant hostility but in the light of the 
enduring interests of the United 
States in the Western Pacific. 
In this context we will better be 
able to find appropriate responses at 
appropriate times to the specific prob-
lems of the Sino-U. S. relationship, 
whether they have to do with U. N. 
representation or diplomatic recog-
nition or the off-shore islands or what-
ever. Without prior adjustment in 
perspective, however, to seek to deal 
definitively with these questions 
would be, to say the least, an exercise 
in futility. 
I should emphasite before conclud-
ing that it is unlikely that there will 
be any eager Chinese responses to 
initiatives on our part. Nevertheless, 
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I see nothing to be lost for this nation 
in trying to move along the Ii nes 
which have been suggested. Chinese 
intransigence is no license for Ameri-
can intransigence. Our stake in the 
situation in the 'Vestern Pacific is too 
large for that sort of infantile indul-
gence. 
A Time For Deep Thought 
I see great rele\ a nee in thinking 
deeply of the issues which eli\ ide 
China and the l.lnited States to see 
if the) can be recast in new and un-
cluttered molds. There is e\ er) rea-
son, especial!) for ;oung people, to 
examine most close!) the premises of 
poliC) regarding China which were 
enshrined almost t\\"O decade~ ago. 
The fact is that the breakdown in 
Chinese-U.S. relatiom was one of the 
great failures of 111) gene1 at ion and 
it is high!) doubtful that its full re-
pair shall be seen in m; liletime. The 
problem, therefore, will fall huge!) to 
)OU. It is not a partie ula1l) happ) 
inheritance, but there is 1 cason LO 
hope that Jt ma\ fare better in )OUJ 
hands. 
Unlike ll1) generation, )OU know 
about Asia. You have a greater aware-
ness of its importance to this nation 
and to the world. In l9cJ2, (our 
months after Pearl ll arbor, for ex-
ample, an opinion poll found that 
sixty percent of a national sample of 
Americans still could not locate either 
China or India on an outline map 
of the world. Certain]) that would not 
be the case toda). Furthermore, )OU 
ha,·e not had the experience of na-
tional trauma in moving abruptly 
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from an era marked by an almost 
fawning benevolence toward China 
to one of thorough disenchantment. 
You were spared the fierce hostilities 
which rent this nation internall), as 
a sense of warmth, sympathy, and 
security regarding China ga\e way to 
feelings of rendsion, hatred, and in-
security. 
Your Chinese counterparts, the 
young people of today's China-they 
are called the "Heirs of the Revolu-
tion"-have a similar gap to bridge 
as they look across the Pacific. Your 
generation in China, too, has been 
contained and isolated, and its view 
of the United States has been colored 
with the hates of another time. It has 
had no contact with you or, indeed, 
with much of the world outside 
China. 
On the other hand, those )Oung 
people have grown up under easier 
conditions than the older generation 
of Chinese who lived their youth in 
years of continuous war and revolu-
tion. It may be that thC) can face 
you and the rest of the wotld with 
greater equanamity and assurance 
than has been the case at an) time in 
modern Chinese history. 
New Hands Needed 
I urge you to think for yourselves 
about China. I urge you to approach, 
with a new objectivity, that nst na-
tion, with its great population of 
industrious and intelligent people. 
Bear in mind that the peace of Asia 
and the world will depend on China 
as much as it does on this nation, the 
Soviet Union, or an) other, not be-
cause China is Communist but be-
cause China is China-among the 
largest countries in the world and the 
most populous. 
Mao Tse-Tung remarked in an in-
terview several years ago that "future 
events would be decided by future 
generations." Insofar as his words in-
volve the relationship of this nation 
and China, whether they prove to be 
a prophecy of doom or a forecast of a 
happier future will depend not so 
much on us, the "Old China Hands" 
of yesterday, but on you, the "New 
American Hands" of tomorrow. 
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